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The Truth about Sherlock Holmes 
FREDRIK HARALDSEN1 
ABSTRACT: According to possibilism, or non-actualism, fictional characters are possible 
individuals. Possibilist accounts of fiction do not only assign the intuitively correct 
truth-conditions to sentences in a fiction, but has the potential to provide powerful ex-
planatory models for a wide range of phenomena associated with fiction (though these 
two aspects of possibilism are, I argue, crucially distinct). Apart from the classic de-
fense by David Lewis the idea of modeling fiction in terms of possible worlds have 
been widely criticized. In this article, I provide a defense of a possibilist account against 
some lines of criticism. To do so, I assume that names for fictional characters are di-
rectly referential and a possible-worlds model that accommodates transworld identity. 
On this background, I argue, it is possible to construct an elegant model of fictional 
discourse using familiar models of information exchange in ordinary discourse, and I 
sketch how this model can be used to i) make a natural distinction between fictional 
and counterfactual discourse, ii) account for creativity, and iii) sustain a natural defini-
tion of truth-in-fiction that avoids certain familiar objections to possibilism. Though I 
set aside questions about the metaphysical commitments of a possible-world interpre-
tation here, there is accordingly reason to think that the battle over possibilist treatments 
of fiction will have to be fought over metaphysical foundations rather than technical 
shortcomings. 
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1. Introduction 
 Realists about fictional characters are committed to an ontology of 
fictional characters. A benefit of realism is the ability to make relatively 
straightforward sense of talk about such characters; though ‘Trump is hu-
man’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes is human’ differ in truth-value, the sentences 
seem prima facie to have the same kind of semantic content, and if 
‘Trump’ refers to Trump and ‘Trump is tall’ expresses a singular proposi-
tion whose truth-conditions depend on how things are with Trump, one 
may expect the same to apply to ‘Holmes’. Prima facie, then, ‘Holmes’ 
refers to Holmes, and sentences involving Holmes express singular prop-
ositions that are assigned truth conditions the same way sentences con-
taining ‘Trump’ are. 
 Realists disagree about the nature of these characters, however. Accord-
ing to possibilism, or non-actualism, fictional characters are possible ob-
jects. Although Holmes does not actually exist, he could have, and does 
exist in some possible world different from the actual one. Moreover, we 
understand sentences containing ‘Holmes’ at least in part by grasping what 
things are like in worlds relative to which those sentences are true. In the 
present article I provide a partial defense of possibilism. However, to do so 
we should distinguish two distinct goals a possibilist analysis could aim to 
achieve. First, a possibilist analysis might aim to provide a semantic theory 
for sentences in fiction, one that assigns intuitively correct truth-conditions 
to such sentences. Now, I will assume that sentences containing ‘Holmes’ 
express singular propositions and that ‘Holmes’ directly refers to the 
merely possible object Holmes, who exists in multiple worlds where he 
instantiates different properties. A challenge to this view that I briefly dis-
cuss below is to explain how we can refer to the right individual (see Kripke 
2011; Thomasson 1999). To provide a semantic theory that identifies truth-
conditions for each sentence in a fiction, however, we need not worry for 
instance about what counts as true in a fiction or whether there is a set of 
relevant worlds that can serve as truth-makers for the whole fiction.  
 A second goal is to develop a model of fiction as a type of discourse, 
that can help explain how we interpret, and share interpretations of, fic-
tional narratives. Doing so requires for instance accounts of what counts as 
being the case in a story, what distinguishes storytelling from counterfac-
tual discourse and how possible worlds can be used to reflect the creative 
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aspect of storytelling. The primary aim of this article is to sketch a frame-
work that can support the second goal. I do not intended to offer a compre-
hensive theory of literary interpretation, of course; questions about the role 
of the narrator or rhetorical devices such as irony or metaphor, for instance, 
are beyond the scope of this article and probably beyond what we can ex-
pect to model with possible worlds alone. Rather, my goal is to identify 
some basic tools that can later be supplemented in various ways. 
 To provide such a framework we need an account of what it takes for a 
claim to count as true in a fiction. A first stab may be: 
 (1)  In fiction f, ‘s’ is true iff in the (relevant) possible worlds reflect-
ing f, s. 
 Two points are worth making here. First, we need to specify what it 
takes for worlds to be relevant. For the moment, think of the relevant 
worlds as the closest ones in which the events described in f take place. I 
return to this issue below. Second, (1) assumes that utterances of sentences 
such as ‘Holmes is a detective’ are (in the relevant contexts) elliptical for 
‘in the fiction, Holmes is a detective’. We could, however, interpret such 
sentences as non-elliptical and literally false but rather understand fiction 
talk for instance as engendering a shift in the context of assessment (fol-
lowing e.g. Kölbel 2002; MacFarlane 2005). Either option will in principle 
work for my purposes. 
 Possibilism does not only predict intuitively correct truth-conditions for 
sentences containing names for fictional characters, but in many cases also 
their intuitively correct truth-values, and does so in many ways better than 
other realist theories – Meinongian views, Platonism or abstract artifact 
theories – or irrealist views. Possibilism predicts that ‘Holmes does not ex-
ist’ and ‘there is no Holmes’ are true, insofar as existence ascriptions in-
volve implicit restriction to the actual world. ‘Holmes is a detective’ has 
both a true and a false reading, depending on the presence or scope of an 
‘in-the-fiction’ operator. Moreover, possibilism seems able to account for 
issues such as embedded fictions, intertextual comparisons (‘Holmes is 
smarter than Poirot’), meta-fictional claims (‘Holmes is a fictional charac-
ter’) and even make sense of speculations about characters’ motivations or 
psychology, also when these are not explicitly detailed, insofar as there 
may well be a fact of the matter in the closest worlds where a character acts 
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as described in the fiction. Possibilism even gives us a basis for explaining 
how it is possible to learn from fiction – not only facts about the actual 
world related in the fiction, but about morality or the human condition. Of 
course, I will not have space to discuss all these features in detail here. But 
even the apparent ease with which possibilism can accommodate the intu-
itive data is some evidence in its favor. 
 There are, however, important questions I will set aside here; I mention 
some of them in Section 2. In Section 3 I sketch a possibilist model of 
fiction and explain how it accommodates i) creativity and ii) the distinction 
between fictional and counterfactual talk. In Section 4 I sketch and defend 
a promising theory of truth-in-fiction. 
2. Referring to Holmes 
 There are several issues I do not have room to discuss. I merely note 
some of them here: 
 1) To provide a theory of truth for fiction it is natural to assume that we 
need possible worlds to be fairly metaphysically robust. To what extent we 
are committed to modal realism is a question I leave open. 
 2) I will assume that names are directly referential. A commitment to 
direct reference sits uncomfortably with a counterpart theory of modality, 
which appears to require some form of descriptivism (see Sullivan 2005, 
for discussion). A counterfactual claim about Aristotle must, on a direct 
reference view, be a claim about Aristotle, and not his potentially descrip-
tively indistinguishable counterparts (on pain of a change in semantic con-
tent). To determine whether ‘Aristotle could have failed to teach Alexan-
der’ is true, then, we don’t search the space of worlds to discover one in 
which an identifiable Aristotle fails to teach Alexander. Rather, we con-
sider what the case is with Aristotle, and evaluate the counterfactual claim 
by determining whether he is part of a world where he doesn’t teach Alex-
ander. On direct reference views, reference precedes the identification of 
relevant worlds. Accordingly, Aristotle must exist in multiple worlds, and 
the relevant worlds must contain the numerically same individual Aristotle. 
And since we want the semantic content of names in fiction to be of the 
same type as ordinary names, ‘Holmes’ should be directly referential as 
well. As a consequence, we reject counterpart theories of modality in our 
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model of fiction. Possibilism is not wedded to a counterpart theory, how-
ever. If we need robust modal realism, then transworld identity of individ-
uals may be ensured by overlapping worlds or by adopting some form of 
modal dimensionalism. 
 3) For possibilism model fiction, there must be possible worlds contain-
ing magic, ghosts, dragons and people waking up as beetles or cockroaches. 
Widespread essentialism or proliferation of metaphysical necessities would 
be a problem for such accounts of fiction by limiting the kinds of stories 
authors could coherently tell even among stories that appear prima facie to 
be coherent. I will assume that if a story can be apparently coherently told 
in which an object of type A is described as being not-B, this is at least 
evidence that there are worlds where As are not-Bs.  
 The extent to which even widespread essentialism is an obstacle may 
be a function of what commitments our account makes to the metaphysics 
of modality. A constructivist or ersatzist approach might allow us to side-
step essentialist worries even consistently with accepting a wide range of 
metaphysical necessities: to provide the truth-conditions for sentences in 
fiction, we need the space of worlds to contain the logically (and analyti-
cally) possible worlds, but just as fictions are free to change laws of nature, 
fictions are free to suspend metaphysical necessities that are not also logi-
cal or analytical necessities and still be able to model the semantic contents 
of sentences correctly. If x is essentially human, x is human in all meta-
physically possible worlds, but ‘x is not human’ is not logically or analyti-
cally impossible; we can construct or describe logically and analytically 
consistent worlds in which x is not human, and stipulate that these are as 
relevant for our purposes as the metaphysically possible ones. 
 4) We may, as mentioned above, legitimately worry about how we can 
refer to merely possible objects. To defend possibilism as a model of fic-
tional discourse, I need to say something about reference, and in the rest of 
this section I sketch a response to this worry (a complete answer will have 
to be postponed).  
 Whenever I utter a sentence containing a name I succeed in referring 
presumably in virtue of standing in the right sort of relation – perhaps a 
causal-historical relation – to the introduction of the name, and this relation 
is plausibly the same for my use of ‘Holmes’ as for my use of ‘Caligula’. 
But whereas we can tell an obvious story about how ‘Caligula’ got attached 
to Caligula in the first place, it is less clear how Doyle attached ‘Holmes’ 
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to the merely possible object Holmes when introducing the name. Doyle 
cannot have established the reference of ‘Holmes’ by a baptismal act where 
the name was bestowed upon a demonstratively available object, since 
merely possible objects are not demonstratively accessible. Now, if 
demonstration were necessary for fixing reference, then a number of 
names for objects also outside of fiction would fail to refer, including 
names for abstract objects, individuals hypothesized to exist, or unob-
served astronomical objects whose existence is inferred by calculation. 
In these cases, however, we can individuate referents as the individuals 
that uniquely satisfy certain descriptions. But descriptive individuation 
also seems unavailable in the Holmes case. Many merely possible objects 
– perhaps even some (or all) actual ones – satisfy the descriptions asso-
ciated with ‘Holmes’ in the stories in different worlds. But insofar as 
‘Holmes’ is directly referential – and thus rigid, picking out the same ob-
ject in every world in which it exists – it must pick out one of them on 
pain of contradiction.2  
 Note that for descriptivists about the semantic contribution of proper 
names this kind of worry would not arise; for them, the contribution of 
‘Holmes’ is a descriptively individuated role that can be satisfied by nu-
merically different objects in different worlds without affecting the seman-
tic content of sentences containing the name. But since we reject descrip-
tivism, we need to know i) which object, among all suitable candidates, is 
Holmes; and ii) how Doyle managed to refer to it. I think the correct answer 
to the first question is that it doesn’t matter. To be sure, we need ‘Holmes’ 
to refer to a single one among the merely possible referents, but it makes 
no difference which one. As for the second question, I suggest that when 
Doyle started writing about Holmes (or dreamt up the character), his im-
plicit decision to describe a fictional character sufficed to ensure that some 
merely possible object was assigned, arbitrarily selected from among those 
that satisfy whatever properties – perhaps none apart from the name – 
Doyle associated with it at the time. On the surface, the stipulative intro-
duction of ‘Holmes’ resembles a baptism, but instead of having a referent 
                                                          
2  Suppose Holmes = α in world w1 and Holmes = β in w2 and α ≠ β. Since ‘Holmes’, 
by assumption, is rigid, ‘Holmes’ refers to Holmes in both w1 and w2, and the transitivity 
of identity gives us a contradiction. 
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demonstratively available, Doyle assigned ‘Holmes’ to some (possible) in-
dividual or other – the selection domain being restricted perhaps (only) by 
the condition that it be non-actual – that he could later develop to serve 
whatever purpose he wanted in the stories. 
 It is sometimes thought to be required for reference that there is some 
property that o must have for a name n to refer to o that can, in a non-
circular manner, be invoked to distinguish o from other potential referents 
– either through a universally applicable condition such as acquaintance or 
a causal relation between name tokening and referent, or that some such 
condition must be satisfied in any particular instance, even if different re-
lations – satisfying descriptive conditions or causal links – may do the trick 
in different cases. Of course, according to my suggestion there is a property 
Holmes has – being arbitrarily selected as the referent of ‘Holmes’ – in 
virtue of which the relation holds, but this property cannot be specified 
without invoking ‘reference’ (or a notion depending on reference, such as 
‘pick out’ or ‘select’). So, there is no non-circularly specifiable property in 
virtue of which ‘Holmes’ refers to a particular individual. Does it matter? 
There are at least two (compatible) lines of response available to the worry 
that it does. 
 First, one may deny that such a (non-circular) property is necessary 
for reference. A no-criterion theory of reference has been defended for 
names in general (cf. Breckenridge & Magidor 2012), and albeit contro-
versial, I think that approach is more obviously acceptable in the special 
case of names for fictional characters. After all, given that the properties 
Doyle associated with Holmes at the introduction weren’t contradictory, 
he was guaranteed that there is an appropriate individual, that the selected 
referent wasn’t the wrong one, and that he would not go on to describe it 
incorrectly. There was no unique candidate for ‘Holmes’, but it is not en-
tirely obvious that unique satisfier (across all worlds) is a better criterion 
for individuating referents than arbitrary selected individual among nu-
merous satisfiers in the context of fiction. Second, what ultimately mat-
ters is not whether the relationship between ‘Holmes’ and the arbitrarily 
selected object is a reference relation or something else – perhaps 
schmeference, a relation between name and referent characteristic for in-
dividuating characters in fiction. What matters is that we can associate 
singular propositions with sentences containing ‘Holmes’ that have the 
truth-conditions they are supposed to have and play the role in our  
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theories of meaning and intentionality3 they are supposed to play. This is 
something singular propositions containing arbitrarily selected, possible 
individuals seem able to do even if the relation between name and object 
is schmeference rather than reference. 
 The idea, then, is that when introducing the Holmes, Doyle selected a 
merely possible object to serve as referent for ‘Holmes’ among numerous 
potential candidates. Given transworld identity, the arbitrarily selected ref-
erent exists in multiple worlds where he instantiates different properties. 
Presumably, he is a barrel maker in some of these worlds, a detective in 
others, and a future space-traveler in yet others. When making the initial 
selection, Doyle didn’t select any particular world; if he had not yet even 
decided that Holmes was going to be a detective when he started writing 
about him, Doyle had not yet ruled out the barrel-maker worlds. As long as 
the selected individual satisfies the properties Doyle ultimately came to as-
sociate with it in the stories in some world in which it exists, Doyle selected 
the right one.  
 To guarantee that Doyle selected the right one, then, we need to ensure 
that the selected referent could play the role of Holmes. I suspect that any 
merely possible object can do so, in which case we get the guarantee for 
free. This claim may be challenged. In particular, if many properties are 
essential properties of any individual that instantiates them, the guarantee 
would be harder to obtain. If being human is an essential property of any 
human, then Doyle must have decided to select a referent among possible 
individuals that are human. Having decided on species membership is per-
haps not an unreasonable condition for making a correct selection, but any 
further properties taken to be essential makes the guarantee consecutively 
harder to obtain; if, say, height were an essential property, my account 
would be in trouble if Doyle initially selected someone shorter or taller than 
he eventually described Holmes as being. As mentioned above possibilism 
                                                          
3  Questions of reference have, of course, both a semantic side and a cognitive side. 
I am here concerned with the former and have little to say about the latter. I assume, 
however, that singular thoughts are singular in virtue of their form, and hence that 
one can entertain a singular thought even if there is no referent the thought is, in fact, 
about. If this is correct, then there should be no in-principle obstacle to having a 
singular thought about an object to which the relation is schmeference rather than 
reference. 
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sits awkwardly with a proliferation of metaphysical necessities, and the ac-
count becomes less elegant if many properties are essential properties. We 
can, however, account – at some cost – for moderate degrees of essential-
ism; I return to this below. It is worth mentioning that full-blown haeccei-
tism would not be a challenge to my account, however. If fictional charac-
ters possess individual essences, like being Holmes, then the problem of 
securing reference would not arise – in that case Holmes just is the unique 
individual in modal space that satisfies the description ‘the individual that 
just is Holmes’.  
3. The Model 
 According to a common model of information exchange (especially 
Stalnaker 1978) the content of a discourse contribution removes worlds in-
compatible with the content of that contribution from a context set of 
worlds reflecting the information presupposed or shared by the discourse 
participants (that is, the content intersects with the context set). This model 
can be adapted to fiction. (I leave it open whether we understand it as a 
model of the unfolding narrative or of Doyle’s construction of the story – 
these may look rather different.) Now, Doyle, having decided to write 
about Holmes, can be taken to have individuated a context set containing 
all worlds in which the individual selected to be Holmes exists. Assuming 
that Doyle had not yet decided that Holmes was a detective or determined 
his height, the set contains worlds in which Holmes is not a detective or 
has different heights. Presumably, by Doyle’s intention to engage in fiction 
and introducing Holmes as a fictional character, the actual world is not a 
member of the context set.  
 Having determined a context set, Doyle proceeded, over the course of 
the stories, as in ordinary discourse, to eliminate worlds from that set, start-
ing with worlds where Holmes is not a detective, didn’t live in London, and 
so on.4 When introducing new characters, new reference selections are 
needed. Eligible candidates are those that populate scenarios in which 
Holmes could have taken part, and must thus inhabit worlds in the initial 
                                                          
4  My presentation, to make the exposition easier to follow, does not reflect the actual 
Holmes storyline. 
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context set. So, for any eligible Moriarty candidate there must, at the outset, 
be a world in which Holmes interacts with that candidate as he satisfies the 
descriptions associated with Moriarty. The candidates are potentially any 
possible individual (at least among those not yet selected for other roles), 
and there is accordingly, in the initial context set, for any such individual x 
a world in which Holmes interacts with x playing the role of Moriarty. As 
for Holmes, when Doyle started writing Holmes may have been maximally 
incomplete, and every (contingent) property such that Holmes instantiates 
that property in some world. The initial selection, however, ensures that it 
is the numerically same referent that has these different properties in dif-
ferent worlds. Moreover, Holmes was never completely described; Doyle 
never specified Holmes’s blood type, for instance. Incompleteness means 
that we are left with several worlds in which the same individual has dif-
ferent blood types, not different worlds with different referents.  
 As in ordinary discourse, certain updates of the context set are more 
difficult to accommodate. For instance, assume for the sake of argument 
that when starting to write Fight Club, Chuck Palahniuk had not decided 
that Tyler Durden and the narrator (the referent of ‘I’) were the same. At 
the outset, then, he selected different referents for the expressions, and, 
given the necessity of identity, there is no world in the context set in which 
they are the same. When subsequently deciding that Durden and I are, in-
deed, identical, Palahniuk needed to make a new selection. He would ac-
cordingly have to reinterpret everything in the narrative thus far relative to 
a new context set defined by the new referent. This consequence does not 
strike me as a failure of the model but rather as reflecting what actually 
happens when authors make momentous plot decisions (deciding that 
names for lesser characters in fact co-refer requires less backtracking). 
However, as the case suggests, widespread essentialism would make the 
model somewhat less elegant by making backtracking and reselection far 
more frequent and often required in cases where the author would be una-
ware that it is needed. As mentioned above, the plausibility of a possibilist 
analysis of fiction does to some extent hinge on apparently coherent sce-
narios described in fiction being genuinely possible. 
 In the next sub-sections I describe, first, how the model facilitates cre-
ativity and metafictional talk, and second how it captures the distinction 
between fictional and counterfactual talk. In Section 4 I provide an updated 
definition of truth-in-fiction. 
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3.1. Creating and describing characters 
 A common complaint raised against possibilist analyses is that they fail 
to capture the creative aspect of fiction making, turning it rather into a mat-
ter of discovery. Of course, when discovery is discovery of possibilities, the 
difference between discovery and creation is less than obvious. Consider 
the claim attributed – probably apocryphally – to Michelangelo that the 
sculpture was already complete within the marble block, and that he just 
had to chisel away the superfluous material. The description seems correct, 
if idiosyncratic, insofar as the resulting statue was, indeed, an already pos-
sible result of the process. Analogously, developing a story can be modeled 
as shrinking the context set, and developing a character as removing worlds 
by deciding which properties the character should have among those it 
could have had, to individuate a scenario that was, after all, already a pos-
sible outcome of the creative process. 
 Of course, Michelangelo’s description neglects the crucial point that he 
chose which of many possible statues he was going to carve out, which is 
presumably essential to the process being a creative process. Similarly, 
freedom of choice is a distinctive feature of fictional storytelling, and 
Doyle was crucially free to narrow down the context set any way he 
wanted: As opposed to ordinary factual discourse, where the target is the 
actual world, Doyle freely chose his target world(s) among those available 
at any given point, and freely chose which steps to take to individuate 
it/them. Of course, possibilists will have to grant that in some sense Holmes 
was already there, and thus contradict the creationist intuition that Doyle 
really brought Holmes into being. But our intuitions that Holmes really is 
brought into being are shaky at best, and it is reasonable to wonder whether 
intuitions here are driven by prior metaphysical commitments rather than 
vice versa. At least I think the onus is on the critic to explain precisely 
what’s missing from the possibilist account – keeping in mind it seems hard 
to deny that the Holmes stories are stories that could possibly have been 
told also prior to Doyle telling them. 
 Now, Doyle literally brought things like the narrative, name and fea-
tures of the representation of Holmes into (actual) being, and thereby af-
fected the causal structure of the actual world. The distinction between rep-
resentations and scenarios represented must be managed with some care, 
however. The stories – at least the words and sentences – exist in the actual 
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world. Claims like ‘in Wozzeck the eponymous protagonist is described as 
driven to murder by the oppressive mechanisms in his society’ or (argua-
bly) ‘the plot of L’Étoile is very complicated’ are claims at least partially 
about the actual world and aspects of our representations rather than the 
possible objects represented.  
 Keeping this distinction in mind, our account does not only account for 
in-fiction claims, but also common meta-fictional or critical claims. Con-
sider the following (adapted from Brock 2002, 4-5): 
 (2)  Holmes does not exist. 
 (3)  Holmes is a fictional character. 
 (4)  Anna Karenina is less neurotic than is Katerina Ivanovna (How-
ell 1979). 
 (5)  Holmes would not have needed tapes to get the goods on Nixon 
(Lewis 1978). 
 (6)  The character Odysseus who occurs in the Odyssey is identical 
to the character who occurs in Inferno, Canto 26, under the name 
‘Ulysses’ (Howell 1979). 
 (7)  There are characters in some nineteenth-century novels that are 
presented with a greater wealth of physical detail than is any 
character in any eighteenth-century novels (van Inwagen 1977). 
 (2) is straightforwardly true, as is (3) – being a fictional character en-
tails being a merely possible (non-actual) individual, so (3) truthfully says 
(at least) that Holmes is a merely possible individual. (4), too, is true as-
suming that we measure their neuroticism based on the characters’ appear-
ances in the relevant stories. For (5), start with the worlds that serve as 
truth-makers for the stories. In the closest possible worlds – or at least some 
close worlds – relative to those (which are not necessarily worlds that de-
fine the context set for the stories, but counterfactual scenarios accessible 
from worlds in that set) in which Holmes got the goods on Nixon, he didn’t 
use tapes. (6) and (7) require some care, since they talk both about repre-
sentations and scenarios represented. (6) is true iff ‘Odysseus’ and ‘Ulysses’ 
co-refer, which is certainly likely on our account (though it would, of 
course, depend on factors related to the introductions of the characters); the 
two stories mentioned may, of course, not describe the same worlds of fic-
tion, but that is – given transworld identity – not necessary for the referent 
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to be the same. For (7), it is perhaps best to interpret ‘characters’ as denoting 
possible objects and the sentence as making a claim about how those are 
being presented in the novels.  
 Other cases may be trickier. ‘Holmes is famous’ arguably seems to pred-
icate a property Holmes cannot have in a world in which he doesn’t exist, 
yet is ostensibly a claim about the actual world. However, the sentence 
probably requires paraphrase on any view; on abstract artifact theories, for 
instance, Holmes is an existing abstract object, and abstract objects are not 
detectives and thus intuitively the wrong targets for ordinary ascriptions of 
fame. I think a case can be made even at an intuitive level that the ascription 
requires paraphrase – Holmes does not really have the property of fame in 
the same way, say, Caligula does. A possibilist could at least say that he is 
much talked and thought about, so a suitable paraphrase doesn’t seem 
unachievable. 
3.2. Fiction and counterfactuals 
 Since fictional characters are possible individuals, and fictional sto-
ries represent series of events in possible worlds, the difference between 
fictional and counterfactual discourse is not a matter of semantic content 
or the ontological status of the truth-makers for the discourse. There  
is, of course, intuitive support for this. Although conversational markers 
like ‘consider the following possibility’ and ‘once upon a time’ conven-
tionally serve to signal whether what follows is a counterfactual claim or 
a piece of fiction, respectively, it seems surprising – to say the least – that 
this would affect the nature of the proposition expressed by or metaphys-
ical commitments of a subsequent utterance of ‘there used to be life on 
Mars’.  
 That doesn’t mean that there is no difference. Counterfactual talk and 
fictional storytelling are distinguished by felicity constraints on utter-
ances and rules for updating or managing one’s beliefs relative to new 
information. Counterfactual talk should be constrained by the require-
ment that the worlds of the context set be potential candidates for being 
the actual world; that is, counterfactual talk is ultimately about the actual 
world, and utterances of counterfactuals are felicitous only to the extent 
that they inform agents of actual states of affairs. Fiction is not so con-
strained.  
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 The following suggestion makes the constraint more precise: Let the 
context set be a set W of worlds that contains (or is supposed to contain) 
the actual world. Contributions to a discourse are felicitous only if they 
narrow down the information consistent with the initial presuppositions, 
modeled as removing worlds from W. A counterfactual claim is accord-
ingly felicitous only if it removes at least one world from W. How? Sup-
pose p and q are true in all worlds w ∈ W. A counterfactual claim u to the 
effect that ‘if p weren’t the case, q would not have been’ asks us to consider 
what the case might be in the closest worlds w* accessible from the various 
worlds w where p is not the case, and u removes from W all worlds w from 
which the closest accessible worlds w* in which although p does not hold, 
q still does. For fictional discourse, on the other hand, contributions pro-
ceed in the manner of normal, non-counterfactual information updates 
(though it is of course possible to incorporate counterfactual talk in fiction, 
as when fictional detectives speculate, counterfactually, about possible ex-
planations for observations at a crime scene). 
 Insofar as the difference is a matter of pragmatic felicity constraints de-
fined by discourse goals I predict that the distinction between counterfac-
tual and fictional discourse might sometimes be hard to draw – especially 
in the absence of explicit conversational markers. This seems correct. For 
a relatively mundane illustration, consider examples in (say) a law text-
book. Such examples may involve relatively elaborate stage setting and 
even names for characters. Insofar as their purpose is to illustrate facts 
about the actual world they are reasonably interpreted as describing coun-
terfactual scenarios, yet they often look and behave like brief fictions. Ac-
cording to my proposal the correct classification depends on what role the 
story in the example is supposed to play, not on its truth-conditional con-
tent.  
4. Truth in fiction 
 In light of the model we can offer a definition of truth-in-fiction. Now, 
the proposition expressed by a sentence in a fiction (or its truth-conditions) 
is of course determined by the (unrestricted) complete set of possible 
worlds. What counts as true-in-fiction, however, is the subset that reflects 
the information the fiction conveys, and which is relevant to interpreting 
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it, for instance with regard to understanding (non-explicit) character moti-
vations. In 4.1 I introduce a definition of truth-in-fiction, and in the follow-
ing sections I consider some upshots. 
4.1. Truth in fiction 
 Above we assumed that p is true-in-fiction-f iff p is true in the closest 
possible worlds in which f holds. I return to closeness below, and will for 
the moment just assume it. Two other points are worth making. First, the 
formulation differs from Lewis (1978); according to Lewis, p is true in 
worlds where f is told as known fact. Lewis introduced the ‘told as known 
fact’ qualifier to rule out the possibility that, by cosmic coincidence, the 
Holmes stories report actual events, thus making the actual world a poten-
tial truth-maker. The qualifier would complicate out reference fixing story 
by relativizing reference to a merely possible storyteller. Since we already 
rule out the possibility of the actual world being a truth-maker by Doyle’s 
intention to refer to a merely fictional character, however, we do not need 
the qualifier. 
 Second, fictional characters are incomplete. Many properties, such as a 
Holmes’s blood type, are never settled in the stories in which those charac-
ters feature. Possible individuals are complete. In every world where 
Holmes exists he has a determinate blood type. It should, however, not be 
true-in-the-stories that Holmes has, say, blood type A rather than B, even 
if he does in some worlds consistent with the stories. One option we may 
dismiss is that Holmes is literally an incomplete individual inhabiting an 
incomplete world. Although fictional characters are under-described, they 
are often also attributed traits that entail that they are complete. A character 
described as ‘a normal person’ has a particular blood type since normal 
persons have determinate blood types. Incompleteness is not metaphysical 
incompleteness. Accommodating incompleteness is straightforward on our 
account. If we follow Lewis and deny that there must be a uniquely clos-
est possible world, then incompleteness just means that different worlds 
consistent with the story are equally good truth-maker candidates, includ-
ing worlds that differ only with respect to Holmes’s blood type. These 
worlds also agree on everything explicitly stated in or entailed by the 
story, including Holmes being a detective and not eight feet tall, and also 
on a lot of stuff not explicitly asserted by (but not incompatible with) the 
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stories, such as the usual laws of nature and that Edinburgh is to the north 
of London. 
 Let W be the set of equidistant worlds representing fiction f. We define 
truth-in-f by quantifying over the members of W as follows:  
 p is true-in-f iff p is true in all worlds w ∈ W 
 p is false-in-f iff p is true in none of the worlds w ∈ W.  
p is neither-true-nor-false-in-f iff p is true in some worlds w ∈ W but 
not others.  
‘Holmes is a detective’ is thus true-in-the-fiction, ‘Holmes is five feet tall’ 
is false, and ‘Holmes has blood type A’ is neither, unless of course it is, 
unknown to us at present, entailed by some property actually ascribed to 
Holmes in worlds where the usual facts about biology hold.  
 The possibilist definition of truth-in-fiction has sometimes been criti-
cized (cf. Sainsbury 2010; Wright 2014) for helping itself to controversial 
resources, such as supervaluationism (see Stone 2010).5 Supervaluation-
ism would be needed only if we let every world in which some possible 
individual – a different one in different worlds – satisfied the descriptions 
associated with the Holmes stories be a truth-maker for those stories; in 
that case, sentences of the form ‘Holmes is F’ would be associated with 
                                                          
5  Stone and Wright both notice similarities between the problem of selecting a refer-
ent and the problem of the many, which can be illustrated as follows (cf. Lewis 1993): 
A cloud is an aggregate of droplets. At the outskirts of the cloud the density of droplets 
gradually falls off, but since the boundaries are vague it is impossible to tell where the 
boundaries of the cloud actually are. As a consequence, many different aggregates are 
equally good candidates to be the cloud, and we seem to have no means of identifying 
the cloud with any one of these rather than another. But all of the aggregates are clouds. 
And then we have many clouds, even though there is, of course, only one. The sugges-
tive parallel to the selection problem breaks down quickly, however. Even if we devel-
oped a strategy for picking out a particular aggregate – perhaps an arbitrary one – as the 
value of ‘that cloud’ it would not solve the problem that the other aggregates are, by 
definition, clouds and that the world ends up containing vastly many more clouds than 
it should. The problem of the many is the ontological problem that the number of clouds 
is too large, not a problem of how to pick out particular aggregates. Though we need, 
as discussed in Section 2, to select a single referent for ‘Holmes’ among multiple equally 
good candidates, the existence of multiple candidates is not itself a problem for us as 
long as we can select one of them, as I argued we can. 
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multiple singular propositions containing different referents, and superval-
uationism or similar means would be needed to evaluate these sentences. 
On our account, although there are multiple worlds among the truth-makers 
for sentences involving ‘Holmes’ where Holmes has somewhat different 
properties, it is Holmes who has these properties in the relevant worlds, not 
his surrogates, counterparts or doppelgangers. Worlds where surrogates, 
counterparts or doppelgangers have these properties are not truth-makers 
for the Holmes stories. We do not need supervaluationism. 
 Indeed, truth-in-fiction is, formally, just a standard box operator from 
modal logic ranging over the restricted set of closest worlds where the 
events described in the fiction take place, and ‘p is false-in-fiction-f’ is 
equivalent to ‘it is true-in-fiction-f that not-p.’ Since ‘Holmes has blood 
type A’ is true in some but not all of these worlds it is not true-in-the-fic-
tion, but it is consistent with the fiction: We could define an operator ‘con-
sistent-with-the-fiction’ from ‘true-in-the-fiction’ the way we define the 
possibility operator from the necessity operator and negation.6 The tautol-
ogy ‘Holmes either has blood type A or he doesn’t,’ however, is true-in-
the-fiction since it is true in all the truth-making worlds. The consequence 
that all tautologies are true in any fiction has been criticized (cf. Proudfoot 
2006, 11). However, given that the connectives mean the same in fiction as 
in ordinary speech all tautologies should be true in all fictions. We would 
have a problem if true-in-fiction-f distributed over the disjunction – that is, 
if true-in-fiction (p ∨ ¬p) entailed true-in-fiction-p ∨ true-in-fiction-¬p – 
but, insofar as true-in-fiction is treated as a restricted box operator, it 
doesn’t. ☐p ∨ ☐q is not a consequence of ☐(p ∨ q) in any normal modal 
logic. 
 An advantage of our account is that what is true-in-fiction evolves over 
the course of creating a story. When the author adds information to the 
stories the set of worlds that reflect the stories – the context set of the stories 
– shrinks, and information previously consistent-with-the-fiction becomes 
                                                          
6  Alternatively, assuming closeness, we could treat truth-in-fiction as a version of 
counterfactual reasoning. Let Γ be the set of claims asserted in the fiction. p is true 
according to the fiction iff Γ ☐→ p. Given the incompleteness of fictional characters 
we would then have to deny Conditional Excluded Middle, (Γ ☐→ p) ∨ (Γ ☐→ ¬p); 
claims about Holmes’s blood type, for instance, will not have a determinate truth-value.  
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true-in-the-fiction. By the same token, our account has no problem explain-
ing or predicting continuity across books involving the same universe, or 
other authors picking up where Doyle left off, inventing new stories in-
volving the (numerically) same characters and settings. The recent TV se-
ries locating Holmes in modern-day London, for instance, might be thought 
of as counterfactual Holmes stories involving the (numerically) same char-
acters. Similarly, Alban Berg’s Wozzeck, Manfred Gurlitt’s Wozzeck, and 
Georg Büchner’s Woyzeck inhabit slightly different (sets of) worlds that 
are truth-makers for slightly different stories, but may still concern the (nu-
merically) same individual located in those different worlds. (How to de-
termine whether a character portrayed in one story is the same one por-
trayed in another will presumably depend either on certain psychological 
facts about the author, or causal links between an author’s portrayal and 
previous introductions of characters.) 
 Of course, discussions may be had about what counts as indeterminate 
according to the stories, and the distance between the truth-making worlds 
for a fiction and the actual world may be different than the author intended 
if the author relies on false beliefs about, say, biology or geography, or if 
the story contains unintended plot holes or anachronisms. This is not by 
itself a problem for our account. We should, however, note that when think-
ing about fictions containing discontinuities or anachronisms, we are often 
inclined to engage in repair and, if possible, disregard such errors. I have 
no detailed story to tell about what (pragmatic) principles we rely on in 
such cases, but our model is able to accommodate various suggestions. 
4.2. Closeness and indeterminacy 
 The context set for the stories, as discussed above, contains all worlds 
consistent with everything stated in a fiction, and is not limited by close-
ness – it should be entirely up to an author to suddenly and coherently 
decide that Greenland doesn’t exist in her fiction, for instance, or that 
different laws of nature hold. Yet when interpreting a story we often as-
sume that – unless contradicted by the story – ordinary facts hold, such 
as basic geography or laws of nature. I take it that such assumptions play 
an important role in making sense of and enjoying fiction – at least spec-
ulations about what characters could or should have done rely on import-
ing unstated assumptions about the real world such as standard laws or 
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generalizations about psychology. The worlds that determine truth-in-fic-
tion should be a subset of the context set rather than the whole, identified 
by the proper importation of facts about the real world, according to some 
parameter. 
 Closeness is an obvious candidate for adding the appropriate re-
strictions; that is, the worlds that determine truth-in-fiction-f are those con-
sistent with what is stated in or entailed by f and are, on balance, closest to 
the actual world (or at least do not gratuitously depart from it). Assuming 
closeness would mean that speculations about details of relevant events not 
explicitly detailed in the stories may have determinate correctness condi-
tions. And intuitively, we treat them as if they do; even speculations for 
instance about Holmes’s sexual orientation or whether he had a neurode-
velopmental disorder often seem to give rise to genuinely factual disputes, 
and insofar as what is true-in-the-stories is determined by closeness, claims 
about these matters may indeed (but may of course not) have a determinate 
truth value, depending on whether enough information is given in the sto-
ries, in combination with facts imported from the actual world, to settle the 
issue.  
 It is also worth pointing out that closeness may be incorporated in dif-
ferent ways. Lewis (1978) suggests relativizing truth-in-fiction to the be-
liefs prevalent in an author’s community rather than to the actual world.7 
One possible upshot of doing so is expansion of the set of truth-making 
worlds. If the author’s community does not have a prevalent belief about 
whether some fact p holds or not of the actual world, the truth-making set 
would have to include both p and ¬p worlds, thus introducing more inde-
terminacy. 
 Now, possibilism is not committed to closeness. In principle, a possi-
bilist might define truth-in-F over the whole context set for F – what’s ex-
plicitly stated (and entailed) in the fiction and nothing else – or use any 
other means to restrict the set of truth-making worlds. One could for in-
stance imagine restricting the context set to the worlds that are most aes-
thetically pleasing, although it may in that case of course be difficult to 
formulate conditions for whether a particular fact ought to be imported. 
                                                          
7  The question of whether the set of truth-making worlds should be relativized this 
way reflects prominent and – I take it – open debates among literary theorists. It is not 
particularly difficult to adjust the definition of truth-in-fiction to either option. 
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Indeed, given that i) providing truth-conditions for individual sentences 
does not depend on issues related to interpreting the fiction as a whole, and 
ii) our model of fiction as a type of discourse does not essentially rely on 
identifying the relevant truth-making subset, formulating the conditions for 
which facts to import is not obviously a greater or more pressing challenge 
for me than for other theories that appeal to truth-in-fiction. That said, I 
think many objections to closeness are unpersuasive. In 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 I 
sketch how we may answer some common complaints. 
4.2.1. Accidental imports 
 It has been argued that closeness automatically imports facts we do not 
want to import (see Proudfoot 2006). One may for instance wonder whether 
it ought to be true-in-Hamlet that Sneferu built pyramids, which it probably 
is if truth-in-Hamlet is defined in terms of the closest worlds in which the 
events described in Hamlet take place. But although that consequence may 
be surprising, it is even in principle not potentially problematic – if there 
were good reasons to think it shouldn’t be true-in-Hamlet that Sneferu built 
pyramids, then those reasons would also block the importation of that fact. 
The mere intuition stemming from the observation that Egyptian pharaohs 
are irrelevant to Hamlet is, I think, moot; it is irrelevant (otherwise it 
wouldn’t get imported by default), but I see no good reason why irrelevance 
should imply truth-value gaps. Indeed, if pyramids ever became a question 
in discussions of Hamlet – for whatever reason – it seems legitimate to 
point out that Hamlet is supposed to take place in the actual world (that is, 
the worlds closest to the actual), and in the actual world Sneferu built pyr-
amids. 
 Proudfoot (2006) sharpens the worry with examples of bounded fic-
tions. Suppose we have a fiction G depicting a fictional war in Europe. 
Though the fiction does not concern England per se, it includes a map of 
part of downtown Cambridge, with the marked location of a number n of 
enemy tanks. It is accordingly true-in-G that there are n enemy tanks in the 
depicted part of Cambridge. Proudfoot’s worry, though, is that it is also 
true-in-G, if truth-in-G is defined as the closest worlds consistent with the 
fiction, that there are no tanks in downtown Cambridge outside of the de-
picted area, ostensibly since worlds where as much as possible is kept the 
same as in the actual world except for the n depicted tanks are worlds where 
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there are no tanks outside of the bounds of the given map (‘no-tanks 
worlds’).  
 This result seems wrong.8 But it is not clearly an objection to using 
closeness as a measure for truth-in-fiction rather than to using a particular 
measure for closeness. I suspect we have the intuition that it shouldn’t be 
true-in-G that there are no tanks outside the depicted area because, intui-
tively and independently of fiction, we don’t think that the closest worlds 
where there are n tanks in the depicted area are no-tanks worlds; hence, a 
measure of closeness that has the no-tanks result is simply the wrong meas-
ure.9 We cannot just keep any truth about the actual world we can when 
introducing the tanks; we also need to supplement that change for instance 
with plausible stories of how the tanks got there. That ‘there are no tanks 
outside the depicted area’ is true of the actual world does not mean that no-
tanks worlds are closer when we also make the background changes needed 
to get them there – in the closest worlds in which England is invaded, for 
instance, the invaders presumably employ more than n tanks. Since there 
seems to be many equally plausible background stories, it is indeterminate 
what is the case outside of the depicted area.  
 One upshot is that it will be difficult to provide a formal measure of 
closeness; a proper definition that takes into account plausible background 
histories (or consequences) would presumably require a formalization of 
relevance and probably a solution to some version of the frame problem. 
Fortunately, for the purposes for which we need truth-in-fiction – to inter-
pret and fill in blanks in a reasonably systematic way – we don’t need a 
formal criterion, but can be rather pragmatic about the matter. The less pre-
cise the measure for closeness is, the more claims will end up neither true 
nor false in the story, but it is not clear why that would be a bad thing. 
                                                          
8  Proudfoot’s primary point, though, is that possibilism cannot respect the bounded-
ness of such fictions; i.e. exclude from being true-in-the-fiction any fact beyond the 
boundaries. She is right that possibilists cannot (easily) recognize such bounds, but as 
argued above this is not something that should worry them. 
9  The discussion of similarity relations is vast, and I cannot go into details (see Lewis 
1979 for some considerations). Using closeness for truth-in-fiction does of course as-
sume that some ordering can be achieved, but unlike other issues for which closeness 
matters (counterfactuals, perhaps verisimilitude) we don’t need it to be very fine-
grained. 
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Closeness still yields precision enough in the vast majority of cases to use 
it as a tool for interpreting fictions.  
4.2.2. Competing models 
 The challenges to realism raised by Everett (2005) require further re-
finements. Consider fictions where it is unclear whether certain characters 
actually occur, such as Tatyana Tolstaya’s The Slynx, in which “in the end, 
I think, it is pretty much left open whether or not there really is a Slynx” 
(Everett 2005, 630). Now, the set of possible worlds identified by Tolstaya 
does indeed contain both worlds where there is and worlds where there isn’t 
a Slynx,10 but I do not think we should conclude that it is neither true-in-
The-Slynx nor false-in-The-Slynx that there is one; at least that is not the 
complete story. Holmes’s blood type is indeterminate because it doesn’t 
matter to the story; the existence or not of the Slynx does matter to 
Tolstaya’s story and will matter significantly to how we understand other 
parts of it. Moreover, whereas worlds where Holmes have different blood 
types are equally close to the actual world, the non-Slynx worlds seem 
prima facie closer than the Slynx worlds on the (crucial) assumption that 
they are equally consistent with the rest of the story.  
 I think the correct thing to say is rather that the set of truth-making 
worlds are either the set of Slynx-containing worlds, or the set of those that 
do not contain a Slynx, but not both. Rather, the story leaves it unclear or 
indeterminate which of these sets contains worlds that are overall i) closer, 
and ii) cohere better with what is stated in the fiction. Hence, we get com-
peting models of the fiction, and perhaps no clear means for deciding that 
one of them is the right one. Such indeterminacy is relatively common. In 
many cases, one may perhaps say that a text can give us multiple different 
fictions with very different answers to what is true-in-the-fiction. Another 
example is Patrick Ness’s A Monster Calls, which may (legitimately) be 
read as a fantasy story and as a metaphor-loaded description of the main 
character’s psychological processing of his life situation.  
 Competing models are also needed for Everett’s Frackworld example, 
in which “[n]o one was absolutely sure whether Frick and Frack were really 
                                                          
10  Thus, for the question of whether The Slynx is a fictional character the answer is 
‘yes’; the question is whether this character in fact appears in the story(-worlds). 
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the same person or not” (Everett 2005, 629). Now, insofar as Frick = Frack 
is either necessarily true or necessarily false, the competing interpretations 
require disjoint context sets. The interesting wrinkle in this case is that on 
the interpretation on which ‘Frick’ and ‘Frack’ refer to a single individual, 
the names refer to a different individual than they do on the interpretation 
on which they refer to different ones. Accordingly, relative to each inter-
pretation a sentence ‘Frick is F’ will express different propositions, and the 
meaning of the sentences in the story will depend on what interpretation 
we assume. But this upshot is as expected if we assume that names are 
directly referential; an author of a story like this would indeed write sen-
tences that are genuinely ambiguous, without having a determinate inten-
tion with regard to which interpretation is correct. Accordingly, I do not 
find the example to be a particularly worrisome. 
4.3. Contradictions and surrealism 
 Sometimes storytellers make mistakes and locate the truth-making 
worlds for a fiction further away from the actual world than intended. But 
sometimes fictions also contain outright contradictions and impossibilities, 
true in no world. Inconsistent fictions and inconsistent character develop-
ments are commonly raised objections to possibilism. Now, the problem is 
at least somewhat less pressing on the account developed here. If the ref-
erence of a name for a fictional character were fixed by description, then 
ascriptions of contradictory properties would entail that no referent is 
picked out. However, insofar as reference is determined by stipulation, in-
dependently of the properties eventually ascribed, ascription of incon-
sistent properties is no obstacle to referring to that character. Instead, in-
consistent ascriptions become a problem for defining truth-in-the-fiction 
and identifying an appropriate context set.  
 Though contradictory fictions are tricky, the problem should not be 
overstated. First, the problem arises from genuine contradictions. Watson’s 
infamous war wound, which appears to move around over the course of the 
stories, does not generate a genuine contradiction – there are worlds where 
war wounds move around; they’re just further away than we generally as-
sume the Holmes worlds to be. We often respond to such cases with local 
repairs, but that is because we (for pragmatic reasons) choose to – the re-
pairs are not forced upon us by the fiction. Certain genuine contradictions 
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may also be solved – as Lewis (1983) suggests – by compartmentalization, 
defining truth for parts of the fiction rather than the whole, for instance. (A 
further resource is appeal to competing models, as suggested above.) Intu-
itively, compartmentalization and local repairs reflect ordinary practice 
when facing continuity problems or contradictions, and having to resort to 
such measures is at least no objection to the possibilist account of how 
claims made in fiction can be meaningful and have truth-conditions.  
 Nor is it an obvious objection to possibilism that it has nothing to say 
about how to understand surreal stories or events. In the case of apparent 
violations of the laws of logic, for instance, we should be inclined to say 
that it becomes unclear what should be considered true-in-the-fiction and 
even what propositions the text is expressing. Through the Looking Glass, 
for instance, contains passages where it is less than clear that we have a 
firm grasp of the truth-conditional content. The unsurprising lesson to draw 
from such examples is that fiction serves purposes and exhibits qualities 
not tied to assertions (or pretense assertions) of matters of fact – its propo-
sitional, truth-conditional content – that may even depend on us being un-
able to pinpoint what claim it in fact makes. Similarly, that possible worlds 
can be used to define truth-conditions for claims in fiction and model im-
portant features of narrative fictions, does not mean that they are particu-
larly useful for capturing the value of, say, poetry or humor. Our model is 
intended as a basic model of fictional storytelling as a type of discourse, 
not a template for analyzing literary appreciation or explaining all literary 
tools at an author’s disposal. 
 One source of ostensibly problematic examples come from embedded 
fictions. Now, embedded fictions (modeled using worlds accessible from 
the worlds of the first-order fiction) are themselves not particularly prob-
lematic for possibilism, but sometimes fictions blur the distinction and let 
characters that are real according to the fiction interact with characters that 
are fictional according to the fiction, or enter the fiction-within-the-fiction. 
Insofar as ‘fictional’ entails ‘non-actual’, such scenarios are contradictory; 
in fact, they cannot even be meaningfully described, any more than a fic-
tion using the phrase ‘married bachelor’ in a fiction describes a married 
bachelor. However, nothing in possibilism rules out worlds where individ-
uals have different relationships with the scenarios they describe in their 
stories; the stories-within-the-fictions would not be fictions (for the partic-
ipants in the first-order fiction) in our sense, and their characters not strictly 
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speaking fictional characters (insofar as they are available for causal inter-
action, which genuinely fictional characters, by definition, are not).11 Fic-
tions that describe such encounters or interactions do, by the meaning of 
‘fiction’ for us, accordingly not describe interactions with fictions, but per-
haps with fictions* – contents of stories that are not separated from life in 
the world of the fiction by being non-actual relative to that world, but by 
some other barrier.  
 That leaves us with examples of blatantly contradictory fictions such as 
Sylvan’s Box (cf. Priest 2005), which purports to describe an object that is 
both there and isn’t there at the same time, or Everett’s (2005) examples 
where e.g. the symmetry of identity does not hold. In these examples the 
contradictions are explicit and central elements of the story, and compart-
mentalization or local repairs do not help. In such rare cases I am inclined 
to bite the bullet and deny that the stories are, in fact, best interpreted as 
completely meaningfully describing a contradictory state of affairs (see 
Hanley 2004).12 Truth-in-fiction is a species of truth, and unless we are 
dialetheists ‘it is both there and not there the same time’ isn’t in any sense 
true, not even true-in-fiction, even if the author claims otherwise.  
5. Conclusion 
 I have endeavored to provide a partial defense of a possibilist approach 
to fiction against some common objections, and to (cursorily) elaborate on 
some potential advantages. Major obstacles remain. I have not discussed 
possibilism’s potential commitment to modal realism. Nor have I devel-
oped my response to the selection problem in detail. But insofar as these 
questions can be answered, possibilism has some attractive features. First, 
                                                          
11  That is: There is nothing contradictory about me interacting with Holmes, and there 
are worlds where I do. But it is a contradiction in terms to say that I might (causally) 
interact with a fictional character as such, and should be on any acceptable analysis of 
‘fiction’. 
12  Indeed, Everett’s examples rather call for repair. A non-symmetric relation is by 
definition not an identity relation, so an author purporting to describe non-symmetric 
identity is using the word ‘identity’ wrong; what he or she describes is in fact a different 
relation, for instance a supervenience relation. 
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it provides a straightforward account of the meaning of claims made in fic-
tion, which are assigned the same kind of semantic content as claims out-
side of fiction but, of course, supposed to be interpreted under assumptions 
that the interpreter ordinarily ought to be aware do not actually hold. Sec-
ond, possibilism underpins a fruitful model for fictional discourse. Of 
course, further challenges remain, especially since fictional narratives are 
often far more complex than the toy examples discussed here. We have had 
nothing to say for instance about the role of the narrator (which presumably 
requires at least an extra level in the model), how to understand, say, fourth 
wall violations, or importation of assumptions related to genre conventions. 
 Finally, I have made no attempt to compare the possibilist analysis with 
its competitors. My goal has accordingly been rather modest, and given the 
outstanding challenges to possibilism – in particular concerning metaphys-
ical commitments – this article is perhaps best understood as an attempt to 
help clarify where the real battle should take place. 
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